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Joined 1 year ago
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Cake day: June 11th, 2023

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  • Attributing loosing or making preposterous strategic mistakes to some sort of 5D chess is a weird choice to make.

    I don’t know why so many of you people have such a hard time accepting that the popular conception of Russia as an Eastern counterpart to the US was inaccurate. Turns out that if you consistently invest less in your military equipment and personnel, you have a less capable military. It’s been 40 years since their expenditures have been comparable, and quite frankly it shows.

    Using your old equipment for an invasion would actually be a pretty novel strategy. Ukraine consistently used the best equipment available to them. That that was leftover NATO hardware doesn’t mean Ukraine was choosing to hold the good stuff in reserve.

    If they’re trying to use a “let the reservists die and then send in the competent soldiers” strategy, it doesn’t seem to be going very well. They’re somehow not holding the territory they took very well, and churning through a lot of what was presumably reserve hardware.

    Failing to execute a gulf war 1, and so deciding to chill in a Vietnam situation for … Some reason … for an indeterminate period of time is just not a strategy that any sane strategist would pick.

    If Russia has the ability to just handwave their way to victory if things got too rough, they’ve done a pretty terrible job of demonstrating it.
    I honestly can’t comprehend what you might have seen of this whole affair that would make you think they had that ability, beyond clinging to the notion that a former superpower must still be a superpower.
    They just don’t have the economy or the equipment to be able to afford to burn through endless waves of soldiers like you seem to think they’re intentionally doing.
    They didn’t even get air superiority, which is just embarrassing.



  • An all out war is unlikely, since if NATO involvement was going to kick that off it would have done so by now.
    The next point of escalation that could start something bigger would be stuff like NATO openly sending troops or actively providing fire support.

    US hesitation to allow our hardware to be used for this type of attack is much more to do with the political issues surrounding the war being framed as a proxy war instead of defensive support.
    The electorates support for “saving the day” and “superior US hardware helping keep a country free” is high. Support for a protracted and complex proxy war without clear right and wrong sides is exhausting and hits too many Iraq/Afghanistan buttons for people to care.

    Asking for and publicly being denied permission to bomb targets adjacent to the capitol does just as well at communicating “we can bomb your capitol” as actually doing it.


  • There seems to have been some policy miscommunication between political and military parties of both nations.
    The US has maintained that the restrictions have been to not allow offensive use, or specific long range missiles for targeting well inside Russian territory.
    Ukraine understood this to mean using them to fend off an attack, and only targets within a specific distance from the border.
    In the past few months it seems that much of this has been clarified, and Ukraine is now using US munitions for a proper US “preemptive defensive action inside enemy territory”, because a Russian base in Russia is full of Russian soldiers who will be ordered to attack, therefore an attack is defensive.

    If it was an actual miscommunication or a pivot is unclear, but the US language seems to have not changed, and a policy that acknowledges that almost anything Ukraine does in this war is inherently defensive is much more reasonable.