According to an employee with knowledge of the system, the password to the Louvre's video surveillance system was simply "Louvre" at the time of the robbery last month.
It depends on how well segmented is their network, but all you might need for that is a Raspbery PI with ethernet and GSM.
I’ve done some engagements where we sent someone into the company to get in as an air conditioning tech, and when they got in he planted that device between a printer and the network. It was set up to forward all traffic, but also allowed us to connect through GSM and get into the network.
It takes like a few seconds to plant it.
Or if it’s really bad, then you might be able to reach it from the WiFi.
If your network does not have NAC and just lets unknown devices plugged into a random wall outlet inside, you might as well get rid of passwords alltogether.
There are some ways how to get around NAC. If it’s older 802.1x, you can use https://github.com/s0lst1c3/silentbridge, but what usually works for us is simply cloning the printer MAC, because older printers can’t do authentication and rely on MAC whitelisting.
Making a MITM device that just clones the MAC when you plug it between the printer and the network isn’t that difficult.
Usually, there’s a network for IP cameras, with a central server holding the video. There’s then, usually, a firewall to anything outside that, and frequently just a hardline to a monitoring system. (another computer with lots of monitors, typically.)
Most modern systems can VPN to the firewall and run a client there via remote desktop, and then access the monitoring system that way; but the server itself is not.
As to the complexity of the password, typically there’s different levels of permissions. The basic ones would just let you monitor real time, probably review recordings, and maybe rip those recordings. (but not change settings, or otherwise delete anything.) A place like the Lourve would have multiple guard stations connecting in on the local network; with dozens of guards watching cameras at any given time; and would each need their own account/logins if you wanted to make the password actually complex.
a large part of the problem is just the sheer amount of people that would need to have acounts- the lourve says they have ~1300 ‘reception and security’ staff. (for the record, reception would also be part of the security envelope… though they probably wouldn’t need the password.)
anyone dialing in from off sight would likely have their own password (and have elevated permissions to allow that.). Frequently, by remote desktoping into a system on the local network.
You’ll also notice theyre not saying the security system was actually compromised- even if the cameras were pointed the right way, they’d still have gotten in and out because the windows were a point of vulnerability. They might have been able to respond faster, but they were in and out in ten minutes. a camera wouldn’t be able to stop that, if you account for normal human reaction times… if they’d even notice the ‘contractors’.
Usually, there’s a network for IP cameras, with a central server holding the video. There’s then, usually, a firewall to anything outside that, and frequently just a hardline to a monitoring system. (another computer with lots of monitors, typically.)
I hate to say it man, but this assumes someone is going above and beyond to lock down the cameras.
I used to have a milestone implementation where I work. There was a security PC in a security office that has the cameras on and always logged in but nobody shuts down requests for camera access for other users. The flimsiest of justification is all that is necessary for the highest level of leadership to give the go ahead. We do manufacturing and everyone thinks these low quality grainy security cameras are a replacement to going on the floor and actually watching how things are working so dozens of non-security people had access.
When I started everybody was using the same local account to log in. I migrated us to AD authentication (with exception of the security PC) but anybody could still technically reach the camera system from the network.
Absolutely anybody could just enter the IP of a camera on the network though and view what it sees. Every camera had default passwords. We even had some fun brands like Hikvision that were banned in 2022 by the FCC. We had a firewall from the outside world, but a guest network that was not isolated at all.
We’ve migrated to a different solution that cost hundreds of thousands of dollars and over a year of replacing cameras, but still probably a third of people in the org have access to the cameras for bullshit reasons and leadership doesn’t care to shut it down. Thankfully none of them are admins and nobody but myself and a couple of others have any kind of admin level permissions now, but my point is that it’s the wild west out there in terms of IT processes… and often Shadow IT from groups like a security team that isn’t truly tech-savvy ends up running something like this.
If money didn’t flow like water due to a total lack of purchasing controls and nobody complaining about expenditure at the time, we’d still be using the same old security cameras. I can’t imagine the Lourve having much of a budget. museums are run like shitty nonprofits and are held together with string and bubblegum in the US.
I’ve known clients that have never removed the default admin account, with a default admin password… and looked at me like I had a horn growing out my ear…
I’ll admit it, I have systems at work with weak or default passwords. But they don’t handle any sensitive information, and exploiting them wouldn’t get you any additional privileges on the network.
that’s just it… any vulnerable system lets them get their nose in the door, then the camel starts snooping around the tent for whatever it can get. Eventually, they find away to something juicy.
The thing is, whether we’re talking about digital or physical security, the weakest thing in any system is the humans. The sloppy passwords (c’mon it should have been Louvre25! lol.) is a human thing. clicking that phising scam is a human thing. kipping off to the egyption bedroom for tryste with receptionist is a human thing.
the simple password isn’t the problem. The people being complacent is.
Until someone figures out how to use this non critical system to exploit other parts of your network. An ssh shell on an internet connected coffee machine in a bank would make a great starting point to gain access to more critical systems for example.
You’ll also notice theyre not saying the security system was actually compromised- even if the cameras were pointed the right way, they’d still have gotten in and out because the windows were a point of vulnerability. They might have been able to respond faster, but they were in and out in ten minutes. a camera wouldn’t be able to stop that, if you account for normal human reaction times… if they’d even notice the ‘contractors’.
This,
Camera are useless at stopping/preventing crime. Thanks to the Camera 5 persons have been charged and wait their trial in jail but camera won’t prevent a jackasss to steal something in a museum
Ok this sounds bad, but I have a question…
Was the camera system accessible from the internet?
If not, this issue is far too overblown.
It depends on how well segmented is their network, but all you might need for that is a Raspbery PI with ethernet and GSM.
I’ve done some engagements where we sent someone into the company to get in as an air conditioning tech, and when they got in he planted that device between a printer and the network. It was set up to forward all traffic, but also allowed us to connect through GSM and get into the network.
It takes like a few seconds to plant it.
Or if it’s really bad, then you might be able to reach it from the WiFi.
If your network does not have NAC and just lets unknown devices plugged into a random wall outlet inside, you might as well get rid of passwords alltogether.
There are some ways how to get around NAC. If it’s older 802.1x, you can use https://github.com/s0lst1c3/silentbridge, but what usually works for us is simply cloning the printer MAC, because older printers can’t do authentication and rely on MAC whitelisting.
Making a MITM device that just clones the MAC when you plug it between the printer and the network isn’t that difficult.
But I agree, NAC is important!
Or some employee might have dropped their own wifi access point onto the Lan for their own convenience.
I found 2 of those on the same floor during one sweep…
Usually, there’s a network for IP cameras, with a central server holding the video. There’s then, usually, a firewall to anything outside that, and frequently just a hardline to a monitoring system. (another computer with lots of monitors, typically.)
Most modern systems can VPN to the firewall and run a client there via remote desktop, and then access the monitoring system that way; but the server itself is not.
As to the complexity of the password, typically there’s different levels of permissions. The basic ones would just let you monitor real time, probably review recordings, and maybe rip those recordings. (but not change settings, or otherwise delete anything.) A place like the Lourve would have multiple guard stations connecting in on the local network; with dozens of guards watching cameras at any given time; and would each need their own account/logins if you wanted to make the password actually complex.
a large part of the problem is just the sheer amount of people that would need to have acounts- the lourve says they have ~1300 ‘reception and security’ staff. (for the record, reception would also be part of the security envelope… though they probably wouldn’t need the password.)
anyone dialing in from off sight would likely have their own password (and have elevated permissions to allow that.). Frequently, by remote desktoping into a system on the local network.
You’ll also notice theyre not saying the security system was actually compromised- even if the cameras were pointed the right way, they’d still have gotten in and out because the windows were a point of vulnerability. They might have been able to respond faster, but they were in and out in ten minutes. a camera wouldn’t be able to stop that, if you account for normal human reaction times… if they’d even notice the ‘contractors’.
I hate to say it man, but this assumes someone is going above and beyond to lock down the cameras.
I used to have a milestone implementation where I work. There was a security PC in a security office that has the cameras on and always logged in but nobody shuts down requests for camera access for other users. The flimsiest of justification is all that is necessary for the highest level of leadership to give the go ahead. We do manufacturing and everyone thinks these low quality grainy security cameras are a replacement to going on the floor and actually watching how things are working so dozens of non-security people had access.
When I started everybody was using the same local account to log in. I migrated us to AD authentication (with exception of the security PC) but anybody could still technically reach the camera system from the network.
Absolutely anybody could just enter the IP of a camera on the network though and view what it sees. Every camera had default passwords. We even had some fun brands like Hikvision that were banned in 2022 by the FCC. We had a firewall from the outside world, but a guest network that was not isolated at all.
We’ve migrated to a different solution that cost hundreds of thousands of dollars and over a year of replacing cameras, but still probably a third of people in the org have access to the cameras for bullshit reasons and leadership doesn’t care to shut it down. Thankfully none of them are admins and nobody but myself and a couple of others have any kind of admin level permissions now, but my point is that it’s the wild west out there in terms of IT processes… and often Shadow IT from groups like a security team that isn’t truly tech-savvy ends up running something like this.
If money didn’t flow like water due to a total lack of purchasing controls and nobody complaining about expenditure at the time, we’d still be using the same old security cameras. I can’t imagine the Lourve having much of a budget. museums are run like shitty nonprofits and are held together with string and bubblegum in the US.
Also, this was found by an audit years ago. Doesn’t mean it was fixed, but doesn’t mean it was still the same during or after the theft.
At least it wasn’t the default password.
I’ve known clients that have never removed the default admin account, with a default admin password… and looked at me like I had a horn growing out my ear…
I’ll admit it, I have systems at work with weak or default passwords. But they don’t handle any sensitive information, and exploiting them wouldn’t get you any additional privileges on the network.
that’s just it… any vulnerable system lets them get their nose in the door, then the camel starts snooping around the tent for whatever it can get. Eventually, they find away to something juicy.
The thing is, whether we’re talking about digital or physical security, the weakest thing in any system is the humans. The sloppy passwords (c’mon it should have been Louvre25! lol.) is a human thing. clicking that phising scam is a human thing. kipping off to the egyption bedroom for tryste with receptionist is a human thing.
the simple password isn’t the problem. The people being complacent is.
Until someone figures out how to use this non critical system to exploit other parts of your network. An ssh shell on an internet connected coffee machine in a bank would make a great starting point to gain access to more critical systems for example.
There was a story a few years back about a casino getting hacked through a smart thermometer in a fish tank.
the Target hack went in through the HVAC system.
This, Camera are useless at stopping/preventing crime. Thanks to the Camera 5 persons have been charged and wait their trial in jail but camera won’t prevent a jackasss to steal something in a museum
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